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Introduction:  
Purpose, Theoretical Framework, and Mode of Inquiry 
 
 In previous papers I have brought philosophical hermeneutics in conversation with 
critical hermeneutics, in order to open the potential for Gadamer’s “moderate hermeneutics” to 
be re-considered as a potential democratic practice of discourse with the potential of 
transforming social situations that are unjust and inequitable (Magrini, 2015; 2014). Emerging 
from this conceptual/theoretical “textual” analysis of philosophical hermeneutics and critical 
hermeneutics, I offer a reading of the ancient Socratic practice of dialectic as a form of critical, 
inclusive, and constructive democratic dialogue, i.e., an expression of local normative 
hermeneutics grounded in a form of understanding that occurs through consensus and 
negotiation among, as Plato calls them in the Seventh Letter, “well-meaning” and “non-
combative” participants.   
 Reading Plato’s Socrates through the lens of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, a 
form of interpretive discourse emerges that demonstrates the concern for social justice in that 
values of a democratic society are already constituted, embodied, and instantiated in and through 
its unfolding, i.e., when we authentically discourse about one or another of the “virtues” we 
embody and insatiate that virtue in the context of the dialectic, and in doing so we establish an 
ontological relationship, this prior to an epistemological one, to the ever reclusive “revelation,” 
or presencing, of virtue (the Being of virtue), and so in dialectic solidarity we experience the 
ethical potential to become just and equitable (Gonzalez, 1998, 1995; Kirkland, 2013). Enlisting 
both Finlayson (2000) and Heidegger (1993), I envisage “ethics” as a “local” phenomenon that 
is “distributive” and “agent-relative (dependent)” in its double-meaning as the ancient Greeks 
understood it  – in terms of “habituated behaviors” (ἔθος - ethos) that develop and evolve in 
communal dialogue and in the more original sense of “dwelling and abode” (ἦθος - ēthos).  
 To embrace Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, i.e., the “hermeneutics of facticity,” 
is to endorse the conditions that all modes of world-disclosure are always bound up with 
“prejudice,” or more correctly, our understanding is always grounded in and shaped in great part 
by our pre-understanding (Vor-urteile) of things, which “can never be dissolved by critical self-
knowledge such the prejudice structure could entirely disappear” (Mendelson, 1998, 53). It is 
possible to state that critical hermeneutics, in its critique of philosophical hermeneutics, remains 
trapped in an “illusory rationalism to the extent that it sees prejudice as something entirely 
negative to be neutralized by scientific method” (53). It is doomed to failure because in order to 
make and substantiate its claims, like all instances of historical knowledge, it too must draw on 
the prejudices that are foundational to all forms of understanding. Gadamer’s (1989) claim is 
that there is no universal form of absolute, abstracted reason, pure, practical or otherwise, that 
would allow us to stand out and over against our heritage and tradition. Philosophical 
hermeneutics outstrips the critique of critical hermeneutics because it avoids the re-production 
of unethical practices, for Gadamer is clear that interpretation does not “simply reconstruct the 
distant horizon out of which the text speaks,” but rather seeks to “attain ‘a higher universality 
that overcomes not only our own particularity, but also that of the other’” (271-2). However, to 
protect against arbitrary fore-meanings requires a “critical component,” which includes 
Destruktion, making our fore-meanings or pre-understanding “conscious,” examining their 
origin and validity, while remaining open to the possibility that they might prove empty in the 
encounter with the text (55), and this calls for “a conscious assimilation of one’s own fore-
meanings in order to avoid the ‘tyranny of hidden prejudices’” (238).     
 Social justice is neither possible through appeals to objective, transcendental reason nor 
critical strategies seeking to neutralize or transcend the supposed “extra-linguistic” ideological-
hegemonic forces constraining and distorting “ethical” communication. Rather, social justice 
begins as possibility within “local” discourse and conversation that is attuned to language and 
tradition as “factical” conditions for authentic human transcendence, transformation, and 
emancipation. This calls for the clarification of Gadamer’s (1989) classification of hermeneutics 
as “universal,” which requires understanding the crucial difference between viewing language as 
a “universal” phenomenon and the attempt at justifying and establishing objective, “universal” 
principles of ethics. It is possible to espouse ethical norms, which outstrip the charges of ethical 
relativism because in and through consensus they are trans-subjective or inter-subjective, they 
are at once distributive in nature and agent-relative (dependent) (Finlayson, 2000) and, this is all 
that is required of or can be expected from claims of an ethical (“normative”) nature – which are 
expressed through statements that are non-propositional in nature. Examining Plato’s Socrates 
in the early dialogues, I focus on particular, or local, manifestations of hermeneutic activity 
(dialectic-as-dialogue) that serves as the ground from which the “normative” and “ethical” 
dimension of philosophical hermeneutics take root, growing and flourishing as a form of 
phronetic social justice in praxis.1  
 
1. Critical Hermeneutics and Philosophical Hermeneutics  
Views on Tradition, Language, and Universalizability 
  
 This paper does not rehearse the Gadamer-Habermas debate (Mendelson, 1998; 
Ormistron & Schrift, 1990), rather, it addresses two critiques of philosophical hermeneutics that 
                                                
1 Much has been published concerning the differences between Gadamer and Habermas. Although the intricacies of 
their extensive debates and subsequent commentaries are far beyond the scope of this paper, I want to make the 
reader aware that there are commonalities that bind them as philosophers, as hermeneuticists, and, in order to avoid 
the fallacy of the false dilemma, it is possible to argue that we need not take absolute sides, one or the other, driven 
by the mistaken belief that a reconciliation between the two is ultimately impossible. For there are commonalities 
the bind them as thinkers in this tradition of hermeneutics and these commonalities might contribute to a renewed 
view of education: E.g., both emphasize the historical and social contexts that influence all interpretation; both 
emphasize the knowledge of lived praxis as above theoretical and technical forms of truth; both reject rigid 
systematic methods over practice; both reject the Cartesian subject-object divide; and both “assure us of the 
possibility of a harmonious, universal consensus, although Gadamer tends toward romanticism while Habermas is 
very much a child of the Enlightenment” (Solomon, 1988, 171). I believe that educators teaching for social justice 
can legitimately work toward just and equitable classroom praxis by attending to what both Gadamer and Habermas 
have to contribute to the issues of collective agreement within interpretive discourse. See also Bernstein (1982) and 
Mendelson (1998). 
are well known to educators linked to critical hermeneutics, and these are interrelated concerns: 
(1) the claim to the universality of hermeneutic principles, which includes the belief that nothing 
exists outside of language, and this, of course, includes tradition and heritage; and (2) the 
inability of philosophical hermeneutics, despite communal discourse, to arrive through 
consensus at an ideally, agent-neutral rational solution to moral problems. This latter critique is 
linked to Habermas’ original understanding of universalized interests in Discourse Ethics, which 
has its origins in Kantian deontological Moral Law, and is expressed through the Principle of 
Universality (U) in terms that are both “collective” and “agent-neutral (independent)” 
(Finlayson, 2000). This view is grounded in the belief that without such a universal principle, 
the discourse about ethics is inevitably saddled with an indefensible relativism (Weberman, 
2000).  
 In philosophical hermeneutics, language provides structure to our scientific, 
psychological, political, and economic modes of human understanding and comportment. 
Language is the universal medium granting sense and meaning to our entire Being-in-the-world. 
According to critical hermeneutics, this view is problematic because it fails to facilitate the 
emancipation of participants trapped within the distorted, unjust, and inequitable language that 
ideological/hegemonic forces shape. Here, “political” and “economic” forces are viewed as 
“extra-linguistic,” and thus, “extra-hermeneutical” factors that distort the way in which we use 
language and hence experience the world. The critique is focused on language housing the 
tradition in such a way that it inevitably “re-produces” and hence perpetuates trends and 
institutions comprising the social order, which includes oppressive and unethical ways of being, 
behaving, and interacting.  
 In order for hermeneutics to address the critical need for change and emancipation from 
constraining socio-political forces, interpretation must be aware of both language and its 
corresponding hermeneutic along with the influence of “extra-interpretive” forces of the social-
political. Critical hermeneutics, through “depth hermeneutics,” offers an escape from the 
oppressive forces constraining language and radically modifies the human’s anterior relation to 
the tradition, it allows for both enlightenment and emancipation to occur through practical 
action inspired by non-coercive “ideal speech conditions” – this is the stage in critical 
interpretation referred to as “application” (Habermas, 1989; 2005).   
 Critical hermeneutics claims that philosophical hermeneutics lacks the so-called 
“critical” component, which is impossible to achieve because it offers no space for human 
agency that lives beyond the constraints of language and tradition. Caputo (1987) offers a 
reading of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics that is in line with Habermas, i.e., 
philosophical hermeneutics “leaves unmasked the question of whether the tradition is unified, 
never asking about the extent to which play of tradition is a power play and its unity is 
something that has been enforced by the powers that be” (112). However, Caputo has no 
sympathy with Habermas’ claim to universality, the “recourse to a transcendental standpoint” in 
ethics (305). In order to re-conceive a “critical” moment in or component to philosophical 
hermeneutics, the following issues ground and guide this interpretation:  
 (1) Ideology and hegemony are not abstract phenomena, they are undeniably linguistic in 
nature, and all language is already political. It is due to the “misinterpretation” and 
“misunderstanding” of language that ideological/hegemonic forces are empowered to constrain 
people – they are not “extra-linguistic” or extra-hermeneutic forces; (2) There is no strict 
ideological reproduction of knowledge, so there can only be partial reproduction and along with 
it, only partial and limited forms of emancipation or “transformation”; (3) Knowledge itself is 
always limited by language and human finitude, thus there can be no mode of knowing that 
escapes ambiguity and dissembling to some extent; and (4) Principles of social justice that 
attempt to live at a universal and objective level fail to address normative and ethical approaches 
that live within “particular,” specific, and unique (local) contexts (the hermeneutics of facticity). 
It is crucial to understand how certain and specific oppressive ideological-hegemonic practices 
are being enabled through language in local contexts, and this concern is the manifestation of 
social justice. At this “local” level, it is not only possible, but as well, desirable, to advance the 
normative (ethical) claim that it ought not be the case that a particular manifestation of discourse 
is discriminatory and exclusionary (Davey, 2006; Gallagher, 1991; Gadamer, 1989; Fairfeild, 
2012).    
    
2. Socrates and the “local” Democratic Context of Learning 
Truth, Finitude, and the Language of Democratic Dialogue in Community  
 
 Reading Socrates through the lens of philosophical hermeneutics radicalizes the 
traditional, conservative, and philosophical (analytic) reading of Socrates-as-teacher found in 
views of education, such as “structure of the disciplines,” or scholar academic ideology, 
embracing the “Socratic method” (Adler, 1982). The “Socratic method” as envisioned and 
practiced in contemporary educational institutions is based on an analytic, doctrinal, and 
“idealist” interpretation of Plato’s Socrates, manifesting on three interrelated fronts: (1) texts 
addressing the philosophical foundations of education or “education philosophies” (Ozman & 
Craven, 2014); (2) texts focused on curriculum studies and aims and purposes thereof (Walker 
& Soltas, 1992); and, as directly related to my concern in relation to critical hermeneutics, (3) 
texts advocating “critical pedagogy” or ideological critique grounded in theories of social 
justice, which are critical of Plato as an “authoritarian” thinker whose philosophy espouses the 
oppressive origins of “idealism” in education (Spring, 2001).  
 Rescuing Plato from the questionable and problematic doctrinal (idealist) interpretation 
by reading his dialogues through the lens of Gadamer’s (1980; 1989; 1986; 1991) philosophical 
hermeneutics is not without difficulty as related to “critical theory,” “depth hermeneutics,” and 
“discourse ethics.” For although it is possible to demonstrate that Plato resists the authoritarian 
label, we are still left with the crucial issue of philosophical hermeneutics so-called “inability” 
to facilitate an authentic and “critical” discussion concerning ethics as related to “social justice.” 
By its nature, as the critique runs, which I’ve introduced above, philosophical hermeneutics can 
neither establish nor facilitate the type of “ideal speech” situations that hold the potential to 
emancipate participants, facilitating their transcendence from the coercive and oppressive uses 
of language. This is because of the essential problem at the root of philosophical hermeneutics, 
namely, the universalizing of language binds it ineluctable with historical traditions and 
meanings that are scientific, philosophical, political, technical, social, institutional, etc.      
 It is possible to understand the “critical” component of Socrates’ dialectic-as-dialogue in 
the following manner expressed as three succinct, salient talking points:  
 
 (1) There is a view of language in the early Platonic dialogues (e.g., Cratylus) that 
mirrors Gadamer’s claims to “linguistic universality” and the ineluctable rootedness in tradition 
(as doxa) that we can never outstrip, transcend, or do away with by means of practices that hold 
the power to live outside of the agent-relative/dependent structure of language – this is the 
doxastic requirement for entrance into the Socratic dialectic. Proximally and for the most part, 
for Plato, this tradition is composed of modes of “education” (paideia) as the training for the 
public life in Athens – the social life as civic-and-political.   
 
 (a) For Socrates, doxai (“opinions”) comprises tradition and heritage, and this includes 
oppressive, inequitable, and unjust traditions that require “critical examination.” It is the role of 
the dialectician, who understands the “naming” power of language, to determine whether or not 
a given name is serving its proper function. The tradition is interrogated through Destruktion, 
searching for origins and reasons for how and why the views we hold (doxai) have come into 
their present forms with an ethical eye on the future as we  work to reinterpret these views in 
light of our ecumenical social projects.  
 
 (b) Socratic dialectic is intrinsically “political” in an original sense of a “politics of the 
soul,” which is a relentless pursuit of defining and embodying virtue that Socrates views as 
inseparable from the social realm, which for Socrates, is indivisible from the political. Since it is 
the search for defining virtue in the pursuit of a life lived well, i.e., an examined life, and this 
occurs through critical encounters with the “public” tradition (doxa), it is for Socrates, 
inherently a political pursuit that should both better the individual, and by extension, the state 
(e.g., the Apology).  
 
 (c) Philosophy as the pursuit for self-perfection has both ethical and political 
implications. For “self-knowledge” (seautou gnothi) is crucial to determining and judging 
collective agent-relative (dependent) ethical norms.       
 
 (2) There is a concern for responding to the ti esti question, “What is it?” – “What is X?” 
that includes agent-relative (dependent) reasoning, interests, and motivations that are concerned 
with an ethical view that is both contextual and circumstantial – i.e., the process is phronetic in 
that it is represents an attuned form of understanding that enhances one’s character (hexis), 
whereby the deliberation and choice of the phronemos (one with “practical understanding”) is 
always instantiated within and determined by praxis (e.g., Euthyphro & Republic). 
 
 (a) There is a unique view of knowledge (philosophical understanding) as related to the 
virtues (ethics) that is never reducible to propositional discourse and includes two 
understandings of ethics – as habituated behaviors that develop in praxis through dialectic-as-
dialogue (ἔθος - ethos) and dwelling (ἦθος - ēthos). It is a form of insight (noein), or 
understanding (verstehen), that, although emerging from the discursive process of dialogue, is 
itself non-discursive. It is non-propositional and cannot tell us that something is the case, rather 
it is a knowledge of “how,” or better, an understanding of what we ought to do that is exhibited 
and embodied within the dialectical inquiry into virtue or excellence (arête); It is manifest, i.e., it 
presences in the midst of philosophical inquiry, and it is neither fully describable nor 
explainable in terms of providing the necessary and sufficient condition for its veracity. It is 
neither wholly subjective nor  objective; it mediates both realms and is intensely “reflexive” in 
nature, i.e., a form of  self-understanding (Seventh Letter). 
 
 (b) Against doctrinal (idealist) readings, Socrates does not pursue definitions of the 
virtues, which would ensure their definitions could be substantiated with the veracity of 
propositions or assertions, which might then be elevated to the level of “objective” universal 
principles of morality, such as is found in deontological a priori ethics. Thus, in line with 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, Soctrates endorses and practices an “interest-based” 
view of practical reason (phronesis), which demonstrates the close  connection between moral 
reasoning, lived experience and the critical pursuit of virtue (arête) and offers plausible and 
legitimate accounts of moral motivation. In such a view, although there can’t be 
“universalizable” ethical norms (gent-neutral prescriptive norms), because these norms are 
always dependent on agent-relative (dependent) consensus, ethical norms established in and 
through consensus do avoid “moral relativism” in that the principles are trans-subjective or 
inter-subjective. Despite not being “objective,” they nevertheless carry substantive “ethical” 
weight because of the agreement arrived at through the negotiation between Socrates and his 
interlocutors.  
 
 (c) The concern with “philosophical understanding” is related intimately to human 
finitude, and the hermeneutics of facticity (context-dependent ethics). Here we find the belief in 
the fallibility and radical limitations of both human knowledge and language. A unique 
ontological view of self-hood that emerges from the reading of Plato’s Socrates is “proto-
phenomenological” and hermeneutic in nature, i.e., the ontology of  distantiation or the view of 
the human being as always living at a distance from any and all forms of complete or full dis-
closure of the issues it seeks to interrogate (Seventh Letter). Importantly, the so-called “ethical 
truths” emerging from the Socratic practice  of dialectic-as-dialogue are never completely free 
of dissembling, partial concealedness, obscurity, or errancy, and this is wholly consistent with 
an authentic view of “normative discourse” as it relates to ethical “statements” as opposed to 
either “assertions” or  “propositions.”   
 
 (3) There is already a “critical” and “ethical” component at work in the dialectic as 
practiced by Socrates as soon as the participants agree on the inclusive terms structuring the 
context of discourse. The group works for the best solution based on their view which develops 
respectfully and in tandem with others in and through, as Plato in the Seventh Letter makes 
clear, “critical,” yet “non-combative,” “well-natured,” and “well-meaning” discourse. The 
dialectic represents a critical “interruption” in the flow and transmission of the doxai in and 
through “conferring” about the problems encountered while working toward potential solutions. 
When “conferring” we are judging the effects of our own and other’s actions with respect to the 
potential effects on future action – conferring represents the act of “granting” or “bestowing” to 
the other a dwelling space in the dialogue, which in advance embraces, facilitates, and nurtures, 
and thus preserves, otherness. This might be referred to as a form of “hermeneutic justice.”   
 
 (a) The “critical” component of the dialectic begins within the mode of philosophical 
deconstruction, which expresses the negative function whereby we recognize and face up to our 
ignorance, our severe limitations as human thinkers. We move through dialectic inquiry to 
disturb the prejudices, opinions, beliefs, and habituated practices that have a hold on us. The 
second move is toward preconstruction, and in this moment we must be open to 
reinterpretations, revisions, and the potential of rejecting that which the dialectic has revealed. 
The final mode of reconstruction, which ultimately leads back to the deconstructive mode in the 
ongoing process, as the dialectic continues to develop, represents the moment when there occurs 
the enlightened transcendence of those engaged in discourse wherein the dialectic makes 
possible the appropriation of new forms of understanding that are latent in the traditions (doxia) 
within which we participate.  
 
 (b) There is a sense of Jemeinigkeit, which is the individuated-mineness through which 
unique and meaningful possibilities come to presence for “my” appropriation that are neither 
available to nor “owned” by anyone else; there is also a sense of communal or ecumenical 
possibilities (unsere Moglichkeit), or “our possibilities,” that emerge in and through the 
unfolding “conversation” that transpires as dialectic-as-dialogue. This represents “application” 
in philosophical hermeneutics – which is the equivalent of Anwendung in German, or 
“appropriation,” indicating a process of gathering and taking up one’s possibilities in such a way 
that we are transformed, and this is also linked with  the notion of finite transcendence – i.e., 
becoming other to ourselves in the face of the other.    
 
 (c) There is an interpretation of doxa as always already harboring the “appearing” of 
virtue and this indicates that there are no meanings that reside beyond language/tradition, and 
that there is no objective “critical” view that we can adopt that resides outside and beyond 
language, which would be required for an “objective” meta-ethical and meta-linguistic critique 
of the language we incorporate to express our relationship to virtue, which is, to varying 
degrees, concealed. Since the meaning of virtue is already present in the everyday doxai of 
virtue, the Socratic dialectic, as interrupting the flow of the doxai approaches interpretations of 
virtue and traditional ethical norms to clarify what exceeds those opinions even in already 
presenting themselves by way of them. 
 
 (d) The context of the dialectic is already, based on a common attunement and the 
agreement among participants to hold themselves in the critical process of interrogating virtue, a 
space that instantiates ethics in an originary manner in terms of an ethical dwelling (ἦθος - 
ēthos). For example, when interrogating “virtue,” the Being of the virtue, and the understanding 
thereof, which presences in the midst of the discourse, does so only when  those involved are 
dedicated to holding open the discussion, e.g., the so-called “understanding” of courage in the 
Laches emerges and is embodied within the unfolding of the discussion, and does not live 
beyond the space of the discourse as would  an instance of objective knowledge. The meaning 
of the virtue in question is to be found in the very process of the dialectic, which is inseparable 
from the practice itself, and not in some answer that would terminate the process – if we inquire 
properly into the nature of virtue, our inquiry will itself exhibit virtue. 
 
 (f) Reading Plato’s Socrates through the lens of philosophical hermeneutics reveals that 
the critical component of the dialectic-as-dialogue does not seek propositional certainty for 
justifying ethical claims, rather its goal is to confront unethical practices and inspire and 
facilitate a change in the ethical “disposition” of those involved in the debate. For  example, in 
Book IV of the Republic, Socrates explains that the dialectic is a critical and “courageous” 
response to the danger of conformism and practices that re-produce and perpetuate unethical, 
inequitable, and unjust mores and norms of the tradition. The cardinal virtues Plato espouses are 
the result of critical interrogation. They were not merely transmitted to Plato and accepted prima 
facie. Rather, they were reinterpreted and hence transformed by the collective philosophical 




 Common to doctrinal interpretations of Plato’s Socrates is the search for definitive 
principles of virtue through the dialectic, which might be said to resemble an “ideal speech” 
context wherein propositional knowledge of courage, justice, temperance, and piety is 
established with apodictic certitude (Finn, 1990). This vision of Socrates, grounded erroneously 
in the very epistemic-technical model he critiques in numerous dialogues (e.g., Charmides), runs 
counter to contemporary re-readings of Plato’s dialogues, especially the “aporetic” dialogues 
(Hyland, 1995; 2006; Kirkland, 2013; Fried, 2006; Zuckert, 1999; Gonzalez, 1998; 1995), 
which have contributed to my attempt at a new reading of Socrates and the dialectic-as-dialogue 
as instantiating principles of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics based on the phronetic 
model of “practical wisdom” (Magrini, 2014; 2015). This view of Socrates is consistent with 
both the ancient Greek understanding of praxis as the authentic realm of ethike (ethics) and a 
reconceived understanding of contemporary social justice, which resists the criticism of critical 
hermeneutics. Here, as opposed to the “philosopher kings and queens” of the Republic, who are 
philosophers-and-teachers in “possession” of knowledge (echonic philosophers), Socrates is a 
“seeker-of-truth” (zetetic philosopher) who resists claims to knowledge possession and eschews 
the moniker “pedagogue” (Meno) – thus, Socrates views the “good life” as a life in transition – 
“care for the soul” and the soul of others sets Socrates in the local normative hermeneutic 
context within a community of learners. O’Neil (2008) refers to this as “hermeneutic justice” 
within interpretation, which “leads to creation of more inclusive ‘micro-climates’ of 
interpretation” (4), which I label “local hermeneutics.”  
 The Socratic life, concerned with interrogating the virtues, is a life lived in terms of 
human finitude, transcendence, and ethical transformation. When interrogating the virtues in 
community with others, the interpretive activity (dialectic-as-dialogue) is grounded in language 
and tradition (doxai), for it is only in and through language that the partial truth, or emergence of 
the veiled essence of virtue, manifests as a mode of “truth” (aletheia) that resists propositional 
discourse or expression in terms of a single “correct” (orthos) and determinative “principle of 
virtue” (Hyland, 2006; Gonzalez, 1995,1998). Yet, despite the inability of the interpretive 
activity to produce a sure and certain episteme of virtue, there is an understanding (Verstehen) 
that appears in the space of the discourse (aletheuein), which contributes to the development and 
betterment of the participants’ ethical dispositions (hexis), which is reminiscent of the formation 
and transcendence that occurs in education conceived and enacted as Bildung.  
A close reading of the Apology reveals that when Socrates, in search of a so-called 
“wiser” man, sets out to interrogate the various members of Athenian society, the poets, 
technites, and politicians, he is concerned not only with whether or not the forms of knowledge 
that they endorse (aisthesis, techne, episteme, respectively) – NB: these forms of “knowing” are 
not to be equated with philosophical understanding of the virtues (phronesis) – can withstand his 
relentless form of questioning in the context of the dialectic exchange. Importantly, as related to 
the “critical” aspects of the dialectic, Socrates is also concerned, and this broaches the realm of 
ethics, with the attitude the Athenians adopt, i.e., the attuned stance that they take in relation to 
truth and knowledge (hexeis tou aletheuein), which might be translated as the “moral” or 
“virtuous” disposition (hexis) of character that manifests in the context of actively participating 
in (or moving into) truth’s revelation (aletheuein).  
 Practice of the dialectic is concerned with the way that communication is structured and 
it seeks in advance to strengthen our relations with others in an equitable and just manner. 
Socrates, adopting the attitude that human understanding is limited, finite, and fleeting, with its 
tendency toward dissembling, enters the dialectic focused on pursuing an interpretation of virtue 
in such a way that his resolute participation in the dialectic is already informed in a virtuous 
manner (doxastic requirement), which requires critical and sustained questioning in community 
to bring into sharper focus, moving ever-closer to dwelling in the Being of virtue (Apology). 
Ultimately, the stance Socrates adopts toward truth in relation to the human condition embodies 
virtue in the discourse (Gonzalez, 1995; 1998), e.g., in the Laches where participants in the 
dialogue instantiate the virtue of courage within the “well-meaning,” “non-combative,” and 
inclusive space of the dialectic (Kirkland, 2013). Despite the dialogue’s aporetic breakdowns, 
Socrates maintains the courage to stand firm and inspire others to hold together in the pursuit of 
the normative understanding of virtue. For Socrates skepticism, dogmatism, and relativism in 
the face of the pursuit of virtue are all forms of cowardice.  
 The tension between knowing and not knowing, the desire to pursue the “good” without 
the possession of definitive principles of virtue, actually represents the true and proper sphere of 
courage, and beyond, the entire realm of ethike. The authentic manifestation of ethics emerges 
within the dialectic’s interpretive movement, social justice in Socrates’ pursuit of “truth” is 
inseparable from the practice of the dialectic, and it is not found in abstract principles or 
propositional truths that would terminate the process (Magrini, 2014). On the phronetic model 
of philosophical hermeneutics, focused on the unfolding of the human’s communal life at the 
local level, phronesis inspires comportment of an ethical nature, for phronesis structures the life 
lived well in relation to others. Within local or particular situations, phronesis is always a 
“judging-with,” a judging that is informed by what is held in common, by what is revealed in 
communal interpretive acts, by what facilitates human transcendence and the continued 
transformation of values (Gadamer, 1989; Risser, 1997; 2000).   
 
3. Conclusions and Significance of the Interpretation 
Reconceptualizing Philosophical Hermeneutics as a Practice of Social Justice 
 
 Based on my reading, social justice is inseparable from the Socratic pursuit of the virtues 
and represents a context of what might be termed “authentic learning in community” – self-
knowledge is crucial for the temporary establishment of distributive and agent-relative 
(dependent) ethical norms and emerges in the pursuit of the ethical life with others in and 
through a process that is “educative” – paideia. Here, the political life and social life are 
inseparable from the pursuit of the “ethical life.” The dialectic of Socrates, structured by 
language and its use, represents the context where understandings and traditions merge and 
coalesce, and through the various approaches employed in the interrogative process, the 
dialectic is at once descriptive, explanatory, and tentatively prescriptive – it is in its own 
important, albeit limited, way “critical” and, hence, “ethically productive.”   
 Thus, much like Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which includes the crucial and serious 
understanding of “play” (Spiel) in interpretation, Socrates’ dialectic is neither a “game” (elencus 
or forensic sport) nor a theory-method of interpretation, but rather the serious practice of “care 
for the soul” driven by the overarching concern for social justice, i.e., normative questions 
concerning the best way to live ethically. Socratic dialectic as interpreted engenders the three 
key moments of interpretation consistent with philosophical hermeneutics: (1) meta-
interpretation generated by analysis (descriptive/explanatory) of a local hermeneutic situation; 
(2) existing interpretation or what is descriptive/explanatory in the meta-interpretation; and (3) 
prescribed interpretation resulting from the process of interpretation or the interplay of 
moments (1) and (2), and these components of the dialectic lead to the “critical moment” 
required for the initiation of change to our existing social problems. Thus, it rises to the level of 
a “critical” process in that it analyzes the interpretation taking place within certain 
circumstances and then moves to prescribe how it ought to take place, the manner in which it 
should change or remain the same (Gallagher, 1991).  
 True, this “critical moment” is based on a consensus that can never lead to universal 
principles of ethics, however, in line with the phronetic model of hermeneutics, to attempt to 
establish universally binding canons of morality would betray the authentic nature of ethics and 
heedlessly equate it with a “sophistic” exercise in the technical application of principles, 
reducing ethics to the realm of techne (Mittelstrass, 1989). Whereas critical hermeneutics seeks 
to neutralize and transcend the constraints of tradition and language in order to achieve 
emancipation through socially just practices informed by communicative discourse, 
philosophical hermeneutics takes a far more tempered view of the way critical, ethical 
transformation might potentially become a reality. We live within language, and language 
always carries the potential for distortion, misinterpretation, and misuse. Rather than seek to 
eradicate these possibilities, which would be impossible, the attempt must be made to live with 
them in a “critical” manner without unduly inflating their effects (Gallagher, 1991; Davey, 
2006).  
 Philosophical hermeneutics teaches us that the ethical life is not experienced in the 
abstract, but rather lived in specific historically dependent contexts, within “living” situations 
that call for a case by case assessment and critique of the social practices in place at this time, in 
this vicinity or habitus localis, among these participants. Emancipation or transformation is 
possible, but it is always limited, it is always ongoing and in need of better interpretations and 
deeper understandings. Social justice is a life committed to self-improvement and the continued 
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